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DISRUPTION IN THE COURTROOM
The American judicial system requires all participants - including the
defendant - to follow prescribed rules of behavior if there is to be an effective adjudication of guilt or innocence.1 Aberrant courtroom behavior by a
defendant requires the court to attempt the delicate balancing of society's
interest in order and decorum against the individual's right to be heard.
This problem assumes special significance if the courtroom is viewed by the
defendant not only as a vehicle for adjudicating individual rights, but as a
mode for voicing political protests and effecting social reform.
Disruption in the courtroom is symptomatic of deep philosophical problems
that draw the continued validity of basic institutions into question. Consideration of the problem of the unruly defendant involves not only methods of
dealing with one who causes disruption, but also the question of whether the
judicial institution is failing to meet the needs of particular segments of society.
However, the realization of the social reform that may be desired by the defendant cannot be obtained in the courtroom alone - courts cannot be expected to perfect the whole solution.
Disruption in a trial with political ramifications presents particular problems. Some feel there is a moral duty to protest - that disruption is a valid
form of dissent. On the other hand, society must preserve an orderly method
of determining the rights of its citizens and cannot be expected to make lawlessness lawful. Consequently, both the disruption and the measures used to
deal with it have significance to society at large that often go beyond the plight
of the individual defendant.
A system of criminal justice capable of dealing with disruption must be
provided. However, minimum control over the defendant's right to be heard
would seem desirable.
This note will examine legal and philosophical issues involved in the area
and explore present methods of dealing with the problem. The solutions
offered are not intended as panacea; a final solution can only be realized
through judicial, legislative, and social interaction.

Tm PROBLEM OF DIsRurrioN
"The trial's a pigl" shouted a defendant on the opening day as the courtroom of Justice John Murtagh was turned into a theatre of revolution by
thirteen Black Panthers on trial in a bombing conspiracy case. With a detective on the stand another defendant leaped to his feet and yelled: "That's
such a lie even Ray Charles could see it." Others led the gallery in chants,
baited the prosecuter, and "oinked" at Murtagh. One defendant pointed an
empty gun at the judge and pulled the trigger.2
Charles Manson, on trial for the murder of seven persons, interrupted
proceedings to complain about the trial to Superior Judge Charles H. Older.
1. "[T']ht fragile legal system functions only if everyone is willing to some extent to
play the game by the rules." Professor Yale Kamisar, quoted in Tn, , Nov. 14, 1969, at 73.
2. NEWSWEEK, Feb. 23, 1970, at 28.
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The judge repeatedy told him to be silent. "Are you going to use this courtroom to kill me? Do you want me to be dead?" Manson asked. "The minute
you use this courtroom to kill me, you know what I'm going to do to you? You
order me to be quiet while you kill me," Manson said, "I'm going to have you
removed. I have my own system you know." Then, without warning, Manson
lunged across the counsel table at the judge. A bailiff leaped for Manson, subduing him in front of the bench. As Manson was dragged out by two bailiffs
he screamed at the judge: "In the name of Christian justice, someone should
cut your head off." One of the bailiffs reported that Manson had a sharpened
lead pencil in his hand as he made the lunge.8
Jonathan Jackson, brother of a black accused of racial killing in a California prison, walked into the County Hall of Justice in San Rafael, California.
Judge Harold Haley was presiding over the case of James McClain, on trial
for a prison stabbing. Jackson sat down among the spectators for a few
moments, then suddenly drew out a pistol and tossed it to McClain. He
armed other prisoners who were on hand to testify in the proceedings. Then
with a shotgun taped to Judge Haley's chin, they marched the judge, the
district attorney, and three women jurors to a waiting panel truck. "You
can take all the pictures you want," said one prisoner, "We are revolutionaries."
There was an exchange of gunfire with the police. When it was over the
judge and the blacks were dead -the judge from a blast of the shotgun.'
These cases represent the full spectrum of disruption in the courtroomfrom minor misbehavior to violent revolution. Disruption is not a new phenomenon," but one that seems to be increasing in frequency. The reason for the
increase must probably be found in the increasing ferment of social activism.
The courtroom is a visible manifestation of the power of society over the
individual. It is the enforcement arm of government and hence to the dissident, a target -both real and symbolic. There can be no single reason for
disruptions. Some are a product of the mental illness of the defendant. Other
disruption might be a deliberate tactic to draw attention to the trial and to
dramatize a defendant's cause. Still others are merely results of unchecked
emotionalism that has escalated into disorder.
Certain distinctions between disruptions should be considered when
attempting to cope with the problem. First, politically inspired disruption
may be distinguished from that caused by the mental derangement of the
defendant or a simple emotional outburst. A court might wish to deal differently with political disruption. A second distinction is a violent disruption as
opposed to nonviolent. A court can afford to be more lenient with disruption
caused by words than with disruption that threatens the safety of the participants and onlookers at the trial. Finally, disruption may be distinguished as
3. St. Petersburg (Fla.) Times, Oct. 6, 1970, §A, at 1, col. 1.
4. Txim, Aug. 17, 1970, at 4.

5. In a case in 1631 a defendant threw a brickbat at the Chief Justice, after being
convicted of a felony. Although he missed the justice, the defendant's right hand was cut
off and fixed to the gibbet, and he was hanged in the presence of the court. Anon. (1631)
Dy. 1886; K.J. AIYER, LAW OF CONTEMPT OF CouRT, PARLIMENT, AND PuBnc SEVANTs 7 (1949).
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to degree. Disruption ranges from minor insults to the court to major out-

bursts that are so severe the trial cannot proceed.
Some feel that current courtroom anarchy is one of the most serious
problems facing society. Professor Delmar Karlen of the Institute of Judicial
Administration warns: "If we don't have control in the courtroom, it is the
end of the courts, it is the end of individual liberty, it is the end of government. It is that serious." Others, however, minimize the danger of courtroom
disruptions and feel that many of the dire warnings are in reality intended to
cause disapproval of the beliefs of unpopular defendants and the lawyers who
represent them.? Consideration of the problem of disruption deals with discovering what level of decorum is actually necessary for optimum fulfillment
of the function of the judiciary and how that level of order can be obtained.
CLMATE AT TRIAL

The emotional climate of a trial is one of the primary factors involved
in courtroom disruption. However, the type of behavior necessary for proper
functioning of a court is probably the least considered aspect of the problem
of disruption. Traditionally, the courts are regarded as chambers of practiced
decorum where a high degree of order is required to effect justice.8 The court
must operate in an environment conducive to an impartial adjudication
if it is to achieve its primary function: discovery of the truth between conflicting versions of the facts and applications of legal principles to those
facts. These tasks are demanding and require a delicate methodology that
cannot be achieved in a disruptive atmosphere.9 The courts must insist that
the proceedings be conducted with the decorum and dignity necessary to a just
decision.1 0 "The dignity, decorum, and courtesy which have traditionally characterized the courts of civilized nations are not empty formalities. They are essential to an atmosphere in which justice can be done.""
The relative importance of the right to a fair and orderly trial in comparison with other legal rights was described by Lord Justice Salmon in a recent
English case involving the disruption of a London courtroom by Welsh
university students singing songs, shouting slogans, and distributing pamphlets:12
6. TIME, March 9. 1970, at 31.
7. N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1970, at 34, cols. 5-6.
8. Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 24 (1952) (dissenting opinion).
9.

AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON DISUPTION

OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 4 (1970) [hereinafter cited as REPORT ON DISRUPTION].
10. In re Greene, 160 F.2d 517, 518 (3d Cir. 1947).
11. REPORT ON DISRUPTION, suIra note 9, at 4; ABA PROJECr ON MINIMUM SrANDARos
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTcE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE
FUNCTION (Tent. Draft 1970) [hereinafter cited as ABA, STANDARDS RELATING TO PROSECUTnON
AND DEFENSE FUNCrIONS] provides: "The objective of such standards is to keep the understandably contentious spirit of the opposing advocates within the bounds and constructive
channels so that the issues may be resolved on the merits.
d. Commentary to §7.1 (a)
at 258.
12. Morris v. Master of the Crown Office, [1970] 2 W.L.R. 792, 800.01 (CA.) quoted
in REPORT ON DISRUPTION, supTr note 9, at 6.
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Every member of the public has an inalienable right that our courts
shall be left free to administer justice without obstruction or interference from whatever quarter it may come. Take away that right
and freedom of speech together with all other freedoms would wither
and die; for in the long run it is the courts of justice which are the
last bastion of individual liberty.
Respect for the courts charged with administering the laws necessary for
the good of society is as necessary as respect for the laws themselves.'
On the other hand, it might be asked whether the courts have need of the
external markings of dignity, the contrived respect required by tradition. The
court, more than any other area of American life except perhaps the church,
continues to rely on the vestiges of medieval formalism.14 The questioning
of tradition is rampant throughout modern institutions; it is not surprising that
one of society's most pristine institutions is now under serious inquiry. If a
defendant fails to rise upon entrance of the judge, should a contempt sentence
be levied? Is a Black Panther salute between defendants at trial disruptive?
These questions point to seemingly trival but, in reality, very significant issues.
In the end, respect for a judicial system should proceed from the respect of
citizens for its fair and impartial administration; it should be earned and not
contrived.
Conduct of the Judge
The most certain bulwark against chaos is the judicial conduct of the
judge himself for, ultimately, order in the court rests upon the dignity and
self-control of the individual judge.'5 The trial judge must be the exemplar
of dignity and impartiality. He should suppress his personal feelings, control
13. R.

GOLDFARB, THE CONTEMPT PowEa 4 (1963).
14. "The court in American society is something like the church. There is a widespread
conspiracy to hold the court holy, above the world of sin and deals and power. It is to
be treated with a special respect; quiet is to be observed by those who enter, and speech
is only to follow formal procedure. The judge is a high priest, possessed of a wisdom
which mere citizens do not have. He wears robes, makes interpretations of obscure
scriptures and holds a gavel (like the cross) representing authority. He is referred to as
'Your Honor' or 'if the court please' ... much as the Pope is 'His Holiness.' Perhaps more
than any other public institution in America, the court system demands an absolute conformity to its rules and its atmosphere." RAMPARTS, July 1970, at 39, 40 reprinted from
T. HAYDEN, THm TRuAL (1970).
15. "A judge has these professional obligations:
"(a) to consider objectively any challenge of his right to preside; to deny it courageously if the challenge is unfounded; to allow it if it is well founded; and to disqualify
himself without challenge if he is biased or plausibly may be suspected of bias;

"(b) to recognize the obligation of every lawyer to represent his clients courageously
and vigorously, and to treat every lawyer with the courtesy and respect due one performing an essential role in the trial process;
"(c) to avoid becoming personally involved in any case before him, to preside firmly
and impartially, and to conduct himself and the trial in such a way as to prevent, if
possible, disorder and disruption in the courtroom.
"He is not relieved of these obligations by any shortcomings on the part of any lawyer
or by the legal, moral, political, social or ideological deficiencies of the cause of any
litigant." REPORT ON DISRUPTION, supra note 9, at 10.
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his temper and emotions, and avoid conduct that tends to demean the proceedings and undermine his authority.16 Particularly in a trial with political
overtones, the judge must often stand above insults by defendants without
betraying partisanship or temper. This standard may be impossible to meet.
As stated by former Supreme Court Justice Abe Fortas: "A judge must have
ice water in his veins."' 7 When it becomes necessary for him to comment upon
the conduct of the participants or spectators, or upon the testimony, he should
do so firmly but in a manner that avoids repartees. He should limit his
comments and rulings to what is reasonably required for the orderly progress
of the trial and refrain from disparagement of persons or issues.' s The conduct of the judge sets the tone for the entire proceeding. He is the central
figure of the trial and misconduct by him, even conduct that would be tolerated in others, is likely to cause or escalate disorder. Even when faced with
trial disruption employed as a deliberate tactic, the trial judge must continue
to be an example of proper deportment and respond cooly and reasonably.19
It must be realized, however, that judges sometimes fall short of acceptable
behavior. "Men who make their way to the bench sometimes exhibit vanity,
irrascibility, narrowness, arrogance and other weaknesses to which human
flesh is heir."20 Under present practices, virtually the only sanctions available
when a judge fails in his responsibility are correction of his determinations
and, perhaps, censure by an appellate court; public criticism through the
news media and censure by the organized bar; and if he serves a definite
term, eventual termination of his services by the electing or appointing
authority. 2'
Conduct of Attorneys
Controversy surrounds the role of the lawyer and the use of disruptive
tactics. The challenge to the legal system and potential harm to clients by
attorneys who participate in courtroom disruption have been debated. "When
lawyers don't play by the rules, a trial doesn't work," warns Judge Kaufman
of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Supreme Court Justice Potter
Stewart recently stated that disruptive trial lawyers were working against the
American judicial system and that their tactics might "boomerang" against
their clients.22 In extemporaneous remarks to a conference of chief justices,
Chief Justice Warren Burger stressed the need to maintain courtroom civility
as the "absolutely imperative lubricant for an inherently contentious process." 23 Chief Justice Berger stated that "unseemly, outrageous episodes" in
16. ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to the Function
of a Trial Judge §B.1, at 4 (Preliminary Rep. 1970) [hereinafter cited as ABA, Standards
Relating to a Trial Judge].
17. NEwswEEK, March 2, 1970, at 26.
18. ABA, Standards Relating to a Trial Judge, supra note 16, §B.1 at 4.
19.

Id.

20.
21.
22.
23.

Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 12 (1952).
ABA, Standards Relating to a Trial Judge, supra note 16, Commentary to §B.1, at 5.
N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1970, at 48, col. 6.
N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1970, at 1, cols. 1-2.
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courtrooms were "undermining... public confidence in the entire system"
of criminal justice.24 Burger urged that states adopt American Bar Association (ABA) recommendations that attempt to establish permissible limits
for lawyers in representing their clients.25 The same day, Michael E. Tigar,
a professor at the University of California at Los Angeles, stated that Justice
Burger's statement about declining public confidence was not true. Professor
Tigar claimed such statements were being used as a basis for a "declaration of
martial law" in the courtrooms by judges who want to silence lawyers of
26
unpopular clients.
During a recent panel discussion before the Young Lawyers Section of
the ABA, former federal judge Simon H. Rifkind stated that the lawyers who
employed disruption were using trials as a sounding board for their own
political and social ideas and "weren't trying hard enough to get an acquittal." 27 Mr. Rifkind termed the disruptive tactics by attorneys "treason"
against the legal system. 28 Another member of the panel, William Kunstler,
listed famous lawyers of the past who were forced to defy judges in defense
of their clients. He asserted the reason for recent disruptions was that a few
attorneys were confronting "the total and abject failure of our legal system
'29
to deliver equal justice under law to all comers.
Attorneys who deliberately participate in disruption have usually been
engaged in trials involving controversial political issues. The major question
present in such cases concerns the proper role the attorney should assume when
disruption is used to gain a hearing for political or social beliefs. The attorney's behavior is seldom in issue when disruption is caused by a mentally
ill defendant or the trial is marked by runaway emotions.
Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility of the American Bar

Association states: "A lawyer should represent a client zealously within the
bounds of the law."30 An ethical consideration directed toward this canon
states:31
Judicial hearings ought
procedures designed to
lawyer has the duty to
engage in any conduct
ceedings.

to be conducted through dignified and orderly
protect the rights of all parties. Although a
represent his client zealously, he should not
that offends the dignity and decorum of pro-

A disciplinary rule under the same canon states that in appearing in a professional capacity in court a lawyer shall not "[e]ngage in undignified or discourteous conduct which is degrading to a tribunal."' ?
24. Id. at 1, col. 1.
25. Id. at 1, col. 2.
26. Id. at 34, col. 5.

27. Id.
28. Id. at 34, cols. 5-6.
29. Id. at 34, col. 6.
30. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL

RESPONSIBILITY AND

7 (1969).
31. Id. EC 7-36.
32. Id. DR 7-106 (C)(6).
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol23/iss3/7
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The American Bar Association and other legal organizations, including
the American College of Trial Lawyers, have attempted to promulgate specific
standards dealing with the attorney's role in disruption. Such standards are
of concern to both prosecutor and defense counsel for they have distinct but
closely related functions and obligations.3 The function of the defense attorney is to provide a vigorous and fearless defense of the client,s' although
there are limits on what a lawyer can do in his representation~S The proposed
ABA Standards Relating to the Defense Function discredit the "alter ego"
theory of advocacy whereby the attorney acts totally in accordance with the
wishes of his client.38 The recommendations of the American College of Trial
Lawyers extend the attorney's personal duty to refrain from a disruptive
behavior to an obligation to attempt to dissuade the client from creating a
disruption.3 7 In addition, prosecuting attorneys are held to courtroom standards at least as high, perhaps higher, than those that govern defense counsel.38 The prosecutor has a duty to be more than an advocate. He has a duty
to seek justice as well as a conviction.3 9 The ABA Standards for Criminal
Justice Relating to the Prosecution Function are an attempt to describe proper conduct for the prosecutor. 40
The American Bar Association standards and those of the American College of Trial Lawyers clearly prohibit participation in disruption by attorneys.
Also, as a practical matter, it is argued that disruption is generally detrimental
to a defendant's chances of gaining an acquittal. The question arises, however,
33. Introduction to ABA, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE FUNc"nON, supra note 11, at 145. "There is no responsible challenge to the view that the basic
ethics of defense and prosecution advocates are the same, even though the roles and functions of the two differ, and that each must perform his role as a professional advocate
within the rules of law and standards of professional ethics. Defense counsel and prosecution
alike have duties higher than 'winning the case' ...." Id.
34. ABA, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTIONS, supra note
11, Commentary to §1.1 (c) at 174.
35. Recent standards adopted by the American College of Trial Lawyers limit the
permissible scope of an attorney's activity by placing upon him the obligation to aid in
maintaining order and decorum in the courtroom. REPORT ON DISRUPTION, supra note 9,
at 6.
36.

"[TJhe 'alter ego' theory of advocacy . . . depicts defense counsel as . . . obliged

...to do for the accused everything he would do for himself if only he possessed the

necessary skills and training in the law; in short, that the lawyer is always to execute the
directives of the client. This spurious view ...is ...rejected by the canons of the
American Bar Association .... [LI]t would be difficult to imagine anything which would
more gravely demean the advocate or undermine the integrity of our system of justice
than the idea that a defense attorney should be simply a conduit for his client's desires."
ABA, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTIONS, supra note 11, at 146.
37. REPORT ON DISRUPTION, supra note 9, at 6.
38. See ABA, supra note 30, EC 7-13.
39.

Id.

40. E.g., ABA, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION, supra
note 11, §5.2 (a) (b) (c) provides: "The prosecutor should support the authority of the
court and the dignity of the trial courtroom by strict adherence to the rules of decorum
and by manifesting an attitude of professional respect toward the judge, opposing counsel,
witnesses, defendants, jurors and others in the courtroom."
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whether a defendant who understands the consequences of disruptive behavior
and still desires to use disruption as a tactic to dramatize his political beliefs,
loses his right to an attorney. It may be argued that an attorney who feels
the alleged illegal actions of the defendant are morally and ethically right
should join with his client in presenting a political defense. Although
such active participation by the attorney should probably be proscribed; perhaps the attorney's duty to restrain the defendant who has political grievances
should be reassessed.
Regardless of any theoretical justification of an attorney's participation
in disruption, the judge must maintain a level of order in the courtroom.
When an attorney causes a significant disruption in a criminal proceeding, the
trial judge should correct the situation and, if necessary, punish the attorney.41
The first option available to the court is censure or reprimand. 42 This should
usually quell a disturbance, especially if accompanied by notice to the appropriate disciplinary bodies in the jurisdictions in which the attorney is admitted to practice. It is clear than an attorney may be held in contempt for
willfully obstructing a trial.43 It is also settled that if he engages in unruly
conduct that would require removal of a defendant, the attorney may be removed from the case.44 In addition, an attorney may also be suspended or
5
disbarred for courtroom misconduct.
The American College of Trial Lawyers has made the controversial recommendation that the trial judge should be able to suspend for six months or
less the right of an attorney to appear in any one case in a court in which he
has been guilty of misconduct. 46 It has been argued, however, that this sanction
7
might have a repressive effect on attorneys representing controversial figures.'
Furthermore, many jurisdictions do not authorize the trial judge to impose
discipline, disbarment, or suspension upon an attorney unless such sanctions
are incidental to or a consequence of imprisonment for contempt. 4
Other procedures under consideration contemplate the presence on the
bench of a second judge to whom contempt matters arising out of courtroom misconduct would be referred; and the presence of observers assigned
by the grievance committee of the bar associations having authority to initiate

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

ABA, Standards Relating to a Trial Judge, supra note 16, §D.1, at 8.
Id. §D.1 (a) at 8.
See In re McConnell, 370 U.S. 230 (1962); Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1 (1952).
ABA, Standards Relating to a Trial Judge, supra note 16, Commentary to §D.1 at 9.
E.g., In re Isserman, 9 N.J. 269, 87 A.2d 903 (1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 927 (1953).

46. REPORT ON DISRUPTION, supra note 9, VI (b) at 14.
47. At a panel discussion recently held by the Young Lawyers Section of the American
Bar Association, Charles R. Gary, Chief Counsel for the Black Panther Party said that
some judges in "Nazi Fascist" courts would use the power to exclude as a means of doing away
with attorneys who represent poor defendants. N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1970, at 34, cols. 5-6.
The Advisory Committee on the Judge's Function of the ABA was divided over whether a
trial judge should have such power. See ABA Standards Relating to a Trial Judge, supra
note 16, Commentary to §D.1, at 9.
48.

See, e.g., Phelan v. People of Territory of Guam, 894 F.2d 293 (9th Cir. 1968);

ABA Standards Relating to a Trial Judge, suprq pqt! I6, Commentary to §D.1, at 9.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol23/iss3/7

8

UNIVERSITY
OF FLORIDA
LAW inREVIEW
Middlebrooks:
Disruption
the Courtroom

[Vol. XKII

disciplinary proceedings against the attorneys in the case.49 However, obvious

administrative difficulties are involved in both these proposals, particularly
the former, because of the inadequate number of judges presently available.
Courtroom Procedures
The type of procedure adopted by a trial court has much to do with the
atmosphere of the courtroom. An effective judge, through his manner of
conducting the trial and dealing with the participants, can reduce the chance
of disruption. All of the participants of a trial should know what is expected
of them and what type of conduct will be permissible. The judge should prescribe at the outset the "ground rules" relating to the conduct that will be
expected to be followed by all participants in the courtroom and that are
not set forth in the code of criminal procedure or in the published rules of
court.50 Because of the physical peculiarities of a particular courtroom, the
problems of a particular case, or the lack of applicable codes and court rules
regarding customs and acceptable practices, the judge can reduce the possibility
of friction and prevent misunderstanding or surprise by articulating the
special rules to be followed in the case at bar.51
Spectators at a trial sometimes participate in courtroom disruptions.
While efforts should be made to accommodate limited numbers of friends
and relatives of the accused,5 2 it is widely recognized that the judge can
remove spectators without infringing upon the defendants in order to maintain
decorum,5 3 alleviate overcrowding, 1 or to prevent the emotional disturbance
of a witness. 55 Any person engaging in activity interfering with the conduct of
a trial may be admonished or excluded and, if the conduct is intentional, may
be punished for contempt. 56 In implementing the right to exclude, the judge
should exercise restraint in inferring contumacious intent to spectators who
engage in minor departures from courtroom decorum; as they may be unfamiliar with expected patterns of conduct.5 7 A gentle correction issued by

trained court officers appears to be the most provident initial response to
such disruption.
During trial, should conduct begin to become disruptive, the judge should
call attorneys to the bench and warn them that he intends to require compliance with proper courtroom procedure. 58 The court should make a concerted effort to lessen courtroom tension and to assure effective judicial control of the proceeding. Latitude in opening and dosing statements may be
reduced to avoid inflammatory statements and closer control exerted over
49. ABA, Standards Relating to a Trial Judge, supra note 16, Commentary to §D.1, at 9.
50. Id. §A.4, at 3.
51. Id. Commentary to §A.4, at 4.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 271-72 (1948).
United States v. Kobli, 172 F.2d 919 (3d Cir. 1949).
People v. Jelke, 308 N.Y. 56, 123 N.E.2d 769 (1954).
United States v. Kobli, 172 F.2d 919 (3d Cir. 1949).
ABA, Standards Relating to a Trial Judge, supra note 16, §E.1, at 11.
Id. at 12, Commentary to §E.1; Commentary to §E.l, at 12.
58. See REPoRT ON DIsumUfTON, supra note 9, at 10, 18.
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examination and cross-examination of witnesses. In general, when a court
senses a possibility of disruption, it should carefully enforce rules of courtesy
and make a deliberate effort to control the tone of the trial.
In the area of procedure, a subject that deserves study is the relationship
of media reporting and courtroom disruptions. It may- be argued that lack of
publicity would negate the attractiveness of disruption as a tactic to gain a
hearing for the defendant's cause. In addition, the advantage accruing to prosecutors who may initiate such proceedings for political purposes would
also be reduced. The English rule of allowing only minimum contemporary
reporting of trials may have advantages, 59 but curbing media exposure denies
a valuable forum to a defendant who often has no other. A possible solution
would be to offer the defendant the option of choosing which type of trial he
would favor - one that operates under a rule that allows only objective reporting of the facts presented publicly at trial or one that operates under
traditional free press notions.60

MEMODS OF CONTROL
Determination of proper court action in dealing with a disruptive and
defiant defendant is one of the more difficult problems a trial judge must
face. The practical necessity of order and decorum must be balanced against
the right of a defendant to be present and receive a fair and impartial trial.
Any restraint upon the freedom of a defendant in the courtroom must be subject to careful scrutiny. In attempting to cope with the unruly defendant,
courts have generally pursued three courses of action: citation of the defendant for contempt with subsequent fine or imprisonment; physical restraint of the defendant in court by binding and gagging; or removal of the
defendant from the courtroom while the trial proceeds in his absence.
Contempt
Contempt can be generally defined as an act of disobedience or disrespect
toward a judicial or legislative body of government or interference with its
orderly process. 61 The authority to punish contempt has been more causti59. The Law of Libel Amendment Act in 1888 (51 & 52 Vic. c. 64, §3) provides:
"A fair and accurate report in any newspaper of proceedings publicly heard before any court
exercising judicial authority shall, if published contemporaneously with such proceedings,
be privileged.
... Unfair or irresponsible publications are denied that privilege. Good-

hardt, Newspapers and Contempt of Court in English Law, 48 HARv. L. Ray. 885, 888 (1935).
60. See generally Note, Procedural Compromise and Contempt: Feasible Alternatives
in the Fair Trial Versus Free Press Controversy, 22 U. FLA. L. Rxv. 650 (1970).
61. R. GOLDF
, TnE Co/mrpT PowER 1 (1963). The power of courts to punish
contempt is one that runs historically back to the early days of England and the Crown.
In Shakespeare's Henry IV and in The Lives of the Chief Justices of England one can
read of the eicapades of Prince Hal, later to become Henry V of England, and his notorious
brush with the law of contempt. Controversy surrounds the historical development of the
contempt power, particularly its summary nature. See Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 198
n.2 (1968). As a doctrine, however, contempt is now firmly imbedded in Anglo-American
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cally defined as a power assumed by governmental bodies to coerce cooperation and to punish criticism or interference; although such interference may
be of a casually indirect nature.8 2 Generally speaking, one whose conduct
tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or
disregard, or tends to interfere with, or prejudice parties or their witnesses
during litigation,63 or otherwise tends to impede or obstruct the court in
discharge of its duties is guilty of contempt.64
Contempt of court has been called the "Proteus of the legal world" as
it assumes an almost infinite diversity of forms. 5 The classification of the
contempt power pertinent to the problem of disruption is limited to direct,
criminal contempt of court. Direct contempt consists of words or acts that
tend to subvert, embarrass, or prevent justice and are committed in the presence of the court or during the intermissions.6 8 Acts constituting direct
contempt encompass actions that hinder, delay, and obstruct the administration of justice; bring the court into disrespect, offend its dignity, or challenge
its authority. 7 Disorderly conduct, insulting demeanor, and disobedience of
court orders are the typical descriptions given disruptions resulting in direct
contempt.86
The power to punish persons guilty of contempt may be regarded as an
essential element of judicial authority. The contempt power is regarded as
inherent in all courts of general jurisdiction, whether state 9 or federal 7O and
exists independently of any special or express grant by statute.7 1 However,
the proper procedure for trying contempt has been subject to considerable
controversy.7 2 Historically, contempt was not tried by jury, but courts and
legislators have gradually retreated from an absolute denial of the right to
jury trial' s Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure authorizes

jurisprudence and any questions that have been raised are less addressed to whether the
power should exist than to what extent it can be exercised and what are its limitations.
R. GOLDFAP.B, Tnm CoNTEMPT PoWR 9 (1963).
62. R. GOLD ARn, THE CONTEMPT PowER 1 (1963).
63. State v. Jones, 111 Ore. 295, 226 P. 433 (1924).
64. Ex parte Earman, 85 Fla. 297, 95 So. 755 (1923).
65. Moskovitz, Contempt of Injunctions, Criminal and Civil, 43 CoLum. L. Rav. 780

(1943).
66. Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1 (1933).
67. Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42 (1924).
68. R. GoLn w.B,
supra note 61, at 70.
69. Michaelson v. Unitd States, 266 US. 42 (1924).
70. United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563 (1906).
71. Weldon v. State, 150 Ark. 407, 234 S.W. 466 (1921).
72. "The contempt power is an extraordinary remedy, an exception to our tradition of
fair and complete hearing. Its use should be carefully restricted .... " Fisher v. Pace, 336
U.S. 155, 167 (1949). "[Ihe grant of summary contempt power . . is to be grudgingly
construed so that the instances where there is no right to a jury trial will be narrowly
restricted to the bedrock cases where the concession of drastic power to the courts is necessary
to enable them to preserve ... authority ... order ... decorum .
Farese v. United
States, 209 F.2d 312, 315 (1st Cir. 1954).

73. R.

GOLDFARB,

supra note 61, at 169.
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punishment of contempt but restricts summary procedure to offences occuring

in the presence of the judge.74
Article III, section 2, of the Constitution provides: "The trial of all
Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by jury." 75 The sixth
amendment states: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury." 76 The fifth and
fourteenth amendments forbid the federal government and the states from
depriving any person of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law." Notwithstanding these provisions, the power of state and federal
courts to punish any criminal contempt without a jury trial has, until
recently,7 gone unquestioned by the United States Supreme Court.7 8 Because
contempt was tried without a jury at common law and the power of the
courts to punish for contempt was considered essential to the proper and
effective functioning of the courts,7 9 the due process clause and otherwise
inclusive language of article III and the sixth amendment were construed
as permitting summary trials in contempt cases.80
The first indication of any diminution of the judge's power to summarily
try contempt was suggested in United States v. Barnett.81 The Supreme Court
held there was no right to a jury trial in contempt cases, but some members
of the Court were of the opinion that severe punishment might trigger the
right to a jury trial.82 The question of whether criminal contempt could be
tried without a jury was again confronted in Bloom v. Illinois.83 Recognizing
the great potential for abuse inherent in the exercise of the summary power
to imprison for contempt,84 the Court indicated that the need for increased
respect for judges and courts was not entitled to more consideration than the
individual's interest in not being subjected to serious criminal punishment
without the benefit of procedural protections. 85 The constitutional guarantees
of jury trial were extended to serious criminal contempts, but the Court did
not precisely distinguish between serious and petty offenses. However, in a
companion case, Duncan v. Louisiana,"° the Court pointed out that petty
74. See Sacher v. United States, 843 U.S. 1, 9 (1952). Rule 42 was intended to delineate

the permissible limits of the court's contempt power established by 18 U.S.C. §§401-02 (1964).
75. U.S. CoNsr. art. M, §2.
76.
77.
78.
(1914);
(1894);
79.

U.S. CONsr. amend. VI.
Cf. United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681 (1964).
Green v. United States, 356 US. 165 (1958); Gompers v. United States, 253 U.S. 604
In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 594-96 (1895); I.C.C. v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 488-89
Eilenbecker v. District Court, 134 U.S. 31, 36-39 (1890).
Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 196 (1968).

80.

Id.

81.

376 U.S. 681, 694 (1964).

82. Id. at 757 (dissenting opinion).
83. 391 U.S. 194, 197 (1968).
84. Id. at 198. "it is ... arbitrary... and liable to abuse." Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S.
289, 313 (1888). "jjI]ts exercise is a delicate one and care is needed to avoid arbitrary or
oppressive conclusions." Cooke v. United States, 268 U.S. 517, 539 (1925).
85. Bloom v. Illinois, 891 U.S. 194, 208 (1968).

86. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
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offenses are defined in the federal system as those punishable by no more than
six months in prison and a 500 dollar fine.87 There is no reason to believe the

same standard would not be applicable to criminal contempt proceedings.
Controversy has surrounded what many consider an evasion of the six-

month limitation by Judge Julius Hoffman in the Chicago Seven Conspiracy
Trial."" Multiple contempt citations resulted in sentences of over four years
for one defense attorney and almost two years for the other. The defendants
received contempt sentences ranging from two-and-one-half months to four
years. "It's an end run, and an open-ended one at that," remarked Ronald
Goldfarb, Washington attorney and author of The Contempt Power.89 Sanford Kadish, professor of law, University of California at Berkeley, termed
the sentences "savage, barbarous and vindictive," 90 while Stanford's Anthony
Amsterdam branded them "exceedingly rare and harsh.""' Multiple citations
arguably circumvent the intent of Bloom and therefore should be disallowed.
A recent Supreme Court case, Mayberry v. Pennsylvania,- further curtailed
the summary power of a trial judge. Mayberry and two codefendants were
tried in a state court and defended themselves, although court-appointed
counsel were permitted to advise. Following trial, but prior to sentencing,
the trial judge pronounced the defendants guilty of criminal contempt for
their actions at trial and sentenced Mayberry to a term of eleven to twentytwo years.93 The kinds of conduct that prompted the contempt sentences included highly personal aspersions and obscenities cast at the trial judge. He was
charged by the defendant with running a Spanish inquisition and was told
to "go to hell" and "keep your mouth shut."94
Upon certiorari, the United States Supreme Court noted that the trial
judge could, with propriety, have held the defendant in contempt at the time
he committed the contumacious acts;95 but when a judge does not act the instant the contempt is committed but waits until the end of the trial "it is
generally wise where the marks of the unseemly conduct have left personal
stings to ask a fellow judge to take his place."9 8 Noting that such treatment
of contempt may prejudice the defendant, the Court concluded that by
87. Id. at 161.
88. United States v. Dellinger, Crim. No. 69GR180 (N.D. IlL. 1969).
89. NEwswxax, March 2, 1970, at 25.
90. TIM.E, Nov. 14, 1969, at 72.
91.

Id.

92. 400 U.S. 455 (1971).
93. Id. at 455. In DeStefano v. Woods, 592 U.S. 631 (1968), the Supreme Court held that
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), and Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968), should
receive only prospective application. Since Duncan and Bloom were decided in 1968 and
since Mayberry's trial took place in 1966, the rulings in Duncan and Bloom do not apply
to Mayberry. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the trial court's imposition of
contempt sentences in Commonwealth v. Lagnes, 434 Pa. 478, 255 A.2d 131 (1969).
94. Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 US. 455, 466 (1971). During the course of the trial
the judge was addressed as "dirty tyrannical old dog," "stumbling dog," "dirty sonofabitch,"
and "fool." Id.
95. Id. at 463.

96. Id. at 464.
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reason of the due process clause and the fourteenth amendment, a defendant
in a criminal contempt proceedings should be given a public trial before a
97
judge other than the one reviled by the contemner.
Although the contempt power may be subject to abuse, it generally does
not interfere with the defendant's opportunity to receive a fair and impartial
trial. The contempt sanction is powerless, however, against the defendant who
is determined to disrupt and prevent a trial. Under the contempt power a
court may imprison the defendant and postpone the trial until he
behaves. Judge John Murtagh used this approach to maintain courtroom control in the Black Panther trial in New York. Judge Murtagh recessed the
hearing and sentenced the defendants to jail when disruption brought the
trial to a standstill.9 As a matter of calculated strategy, however, a defendant
might elect imprisonment for a prolonged period in the hope that adverse
witnesses would be unavailable after a laspe of time.
Physical Restraint
Generally, freedom from handcuffs, manacles, gags, or any other type of
physical restraint is an important component of a fair and impartial trial."9
The defendant must appear free of any restraints to avoid prejudicing the
minds of the jurors before whom he is tried.10 0 In addition, one of the
primary advantages of the defendant's presence at trial, the ability to communicate with counsel, is substantially reduced when the defendant is in a
condition of physical restraint. 101 The use of such physical coercion is in
fact an affront to the dignity and decorum that the court is seeking to preserve by restraining the defendant. 0 2 Although appellate courts have upheld
the right of a trial court to use reasonable restraint in order to conduct its
proceedings in an orderly and dignified manner, sound reasons must exist to
10 3
justify any exercise of the power.
An early consideration of the problems involved in physical restraint
occurred in People v. Harris.0 4 During the course of the criminal trial, the
defendant constantly interferred with the orderly proceedings of the court by
unruly conduct and abusive language. Despite repeated warnings from the
court he continued with the interruptions and, in one instance verbally abused
97. Id. at 466.
98. Nr'WSWasK, Feb. 23, 1970, at 27
99. Way v. United States, 285 F.2d 253, 254 (10th Cir. 1960).
100. Sparkman v. State, 27 Wis. 2d 92, 95, 133 N.W.2d 776, 779 (1965).
101. ilinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344 (1970).
102. Id. In French v. State, 377 P.2d 501 (Okla. Crim. 1963), the use of physical restraint
was described in harsh terms: "Though biologically speaking, man may be an animal, it was
never intended that he be treated as such in the realm of criminal jurisprudence. If we
permitted the subjection of man to such treatment before the courts of our land, we have
paved the way for him to be tried while tied to 'a log or in a steel case, as well as chains
and shackles. Barbarism has been abandoned and must never be permitted to creep back
through the crevices created by lenient rules of law." Id. at 504.
103. State v. Roberts, 86 N.J. Super. 159, 206 A.2d 200 (1965).

104. 45 Cal. App. 547, 188 P. 65 (1920).
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a witness on the stand. When the trial judge stated to him: "We will suspend
the trial until you keep still," he replied, "I don't care if you suspend it
until doomsday."'10 5 During another outbreak the trial court ordered the
bailiffs to see that the defendant was seated and when he continued in his
disruptions the court ordered him gagged. The conduct of the defendant was
such that the court was forced to order a fifteen-minute recess. Although the
court's order to put a gag on the defendant was not carried out, it was contended that the language of the court was prejudicial. The court of appeals
stated that the defendant had the right to be present and that right, notwithstanding the obstreperous conduct, was accorded him.1°8 In affirming the
conviction the appellate court concluded the trial judge would have been
justified in using gagging as a last resort to control an unruly defendant
whose conduct would otherwise prevent the trial from proceeding.107
Another early decision upholding the court's discretion in restraining an
unruly defendant is People v. Loomis.108 The alleged undue restraint of the
defendant consisted of strapping his arms and legs together, his body being
secured to a wheel chair and, at times, a towel being placed over his mouth.
The restraint was ordered after loud and tumultuous conduct during the
early part of the trial. In the presence of the court and jury the appellant had
repeatedly shouted obscenities, and on numerous occasions he had broken
away from and fought with officers who sought to quiet him, kicked the
counsel table, and had thrown himself on the floor. Despite repeated admonitions from the court, he persisted in such conduct until restrained. The appellate court held there was no doubt concerning the right of the trial court
to use reasonable restraint in order to conduct the trial in an orderly and
dignified manner.1 09
A similar finding was reached by the Supreme Court of Arizona in State v.
Van Bogart.1O The record of events indicates that the defendant began to interrupt the voir dire proceedings by inquiring, "What's going on here?" and
stating that he was being "railroaded."1"1 This conduct continued throughout
voir dire examination. The court told the defendant he would have to be
gagged if he did not keep quiet and that the court was reluctant to take such
an action. The defendant told the court to put a gag on him, that he wanted
to be gagged, that he would like a picture of it, that he was not going to
be "framed." The defendant was permitted to continue disturbing the proceedings until voir dire was concluded, and was then gagged. The defendant
was kept gagged during the time the jurors were sworn and during the reading
of the information after which he was allowed to represent himself throughout
105.

Id. at 67.

106. Id.
107. Id. at 67-68.
108. 27 Cal. App. 2d 236, 80 P.2d 1012 (1938).
109. Id. at 1014. See also People v. Merkouris, 46 Cal. 2d 540, 297 P.2d 999 (1956). in
which the Supreme Court of California cited Harris and Loomis and held that in view of
the defendant's conduct there was no prejudicial error on the part of the trial judge.
110. 85 Ariz. 63, 331 P.2d 597 (1958).
111. Id. at 6, 331 P.2d 597, 599.
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the trial with an attorney permitted to advise. In reviewing the facts, the
Supreme Court of Arizona held that although the measure employed by the
court was drastic, it was not only the right, but the duty of the presiding judge
to maintain order and decorum in the courtroom. 112 The court noted that
permissible methods to maintain order and dignity in the courtroom are
commensurate with the necessities of each case. 113 The defendant was dearly
in contempt of court, and punishment by subsequent fine or imprisonment
was wholly inadequate to cope with the situation. The court indicated that the
situation that requires physical restraint is more severe than that which
justifies contempt,11 and that physical restraint is proper only when the
defendant's actions prohibit continuance of the trial." 5
A particularly demonstrative example of the problems of a court confronted by unruly defendants determined to disrupt a trial is the case of
United States v. Bentvena.1"8 One of the issues on appeal was that the atmosphere of the trial rendered an objective and unprejudiced hearing impossible.
The defendants contended that the "mass conspiracy" trial, the outburst and
conduct of some defendants, the comments and actions of the trial
judge, and the publicity attending the trial denied them the fundamental
fairness required by due process. 17 Eleven defendants were punished for
contempt during the trial. On one occasion defendant Salvatore Panico
climbed into the jury box and walked along the inside rail from one end of the
box to the other. He pushed the jurors in the front row and screamed villifications at them, the judge, and other defendants. On another occasion, while
the defendant Mirra was being cross-examined, Panico picked up a chair and
hurled it at the prosecutor. The trial judge responded to the outbursts by
having the perpetrators gagged and shackled."18 The defendants contended
that the failure of the judge to sever unruly defendants from the proceedings,
the ordering of some of the defendants bound and gagged, and the refusal to
declare a mistrial constituted reversible error. The appellate court found
no abuse of discretion in the trial judge's actions taken to preserve the
security of the courtroom and concluded "that the trial judge was justified,

112. Id. at 67, 331 P.2d 597, 600.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. 319 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1963).
117. Id. at 929.
118. In addition to courtroom conduct, the defendant engaged in conduct out of court
designed to prolong the trial. One of the defendants fell or tripped down some stairs. A
physician could find no signs of injury and concluded the defendant was feigning injury.
Nevertheless, he refused to come to court and when brought in a wheel chair insisted he
was too sick to continue. On June 7 Panico was found hanging by a belt in a cell, delaying the opening of court. He was unharmed and a court appointed psychiatrist noted "the
ostensible attempt at self-hanging occurred under circumstances justifying suspicion as to its
genuineness." United States v. Bentvena, 319 F.2d 916, 930 (2d Cir. 1963). On June 14 one
of the defendant's attorneys informed the court that his client had fallen in the shower
and injured his arm. Other "illnesses and injuries" occurred throughout the trial. Id.
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indeed was forced to resort to stem measures to obtain order in his courtroom."" 9
These cases demonstrate the ineffectiveness of the contempt power in dealing with an unruly defendant who is determined to disrupt a trial. The
frustrations faced by a court in attempting to deal with a concerted disruptive situation is evident. In cases of this type there are no dear legal principles
applicable and ultimately the nature of the factual situations are controlling.
There can be no succinctly defined point at which use of physical restraint
is permissible. The standard seems to be that restraint is allowable when a
defendant is disruptive to the extent that the trial cannot proceed. Ultimately,
the decision to restrain must be made by the trial judge on the basis of his
evaluation of the situation. His considerations should include: the type of
disruption, violent or nonviolent; the reason for the disruption, political or
otherwise; and finally, whether any other method of restraint would suffice.
Physical restraint is a drastic remedy that should be limited to only the most
severe instances.
An adjunct to the use of traditional physical restraint has been the proposal to adopt the use of a glass or plastic booth similar to that used in the
Eichmann trial in Israel. The purpose of the booth was to protect Eichmann
from possible assassination in the courtroom; here the purpose would be to
protect the court from the defendant. Members of the American Institute
of Architects and the American Bar Association have discussed the possibility
of a soundproof booth to be rigged with a telephone to the defense atorney
and a sound system enabling the defendant to hear the proceedings1 0 However, the question remains: What impact will the sterile isolation of the defendant in a plastic both have on the minds of the jurors? Although this type
of restraint is more sophisticated, it still represents physical restraint of a defendant on trial and may well produce prejudice injurious to the defendant.
It could be argued, on the other hand, that if all defendants were tried in
such surroundings, any emotional bias would be negated, or even that a feeling
of sympathy might be engendered.
, Removal of Defendant
Possibly an even more controversial method of dealing with the unruly
defendant is to remove him from the courtroom while continuing the trial
in his absence. Saint Paul wrote of the existence of a right to be present
at trial under Roman Law: "[I]t is not the manner of the Romans to deliver
any man to die, before that he which is accused have the accusers face to
face, and have license to answer for himself concerning the crime laid against
him."'121 The confrontation clause of the sixth amendment to the United
States Constitution provides: "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall
enjoy the right. .. to be confronted with the witnesses against him."122 In
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. at 930-31.
TIMx. March 9,1970, at 31.
Acts 25:16.
U. S. CONST. amend. VI.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1971

17

THE COURTROOM
DISRUPTION
Florida LawIN
Review,
Vol. 23, Iss. 3 [1971], Art. 7

1971]

Pointerv. Texas1 28 the Supreme Court held that the fourteenth amendment
makes the sixth amendment's guaranteed right of confrontation applicable
to the states. A defendant in a criminal trial has an absolute right to be
personally present at all stages of the trial.V124 Indeed, it has been held that
the constitutional right to appear is so fundamental that it cannot be denied
25
by the court nor waived by the defendant..
Several cases dealing with the unqualified nature of the right to be
present have been relied upon to argue that the problems of the unruly
defendant must be dealt with in a manner other than removal. One of the
cases that has considered the extent of the sixth amendment is Hopt v. Utah.2 8
Utah law provided that if a juror were challenged for actual bias and the
facts denied, the challenge must be tried by three impartial triers appointed
by the court.U2r Six jurors were challenged by the defendant for actual bias.
For each juror, triers were appointed and each juror was taken from the courtroom and tried out of the presence of the defendant and his counsel. No
objection was made to the triers leaving the courtroom nor was any exception
taken during the trial. The defendant appealed his conviction on the ground
that permitting trial of the jurors in his absence was error. The state argued
that the right of the accused to be present before the triers was waived by his
failure to object to their retirement from the courtroom. 28 The United
States Supreme Court stated it was not within the power of the accused to
dispense with his right to be present at trial. "That which the law makes essential in proceedings involving the deprivation of life or liberty cannot be
dispensed with or affected by the consent of the accused, much less his mere
12 9
failure.., to object to unauthorized methods."'
Another early case was Lewis v. United States30 in which the defendant
appealed his conviction for murder. The trial court had directed that two
lists of thirty-seven qualified veniremen be made out, one to be given the
district attorney, the other to defense counsel. The court directed each side to
proceed with its challenges independently, without knowledge of the challenges
made by the other. The defendant contended this procedure violated his right
to be present at trial. The Supreme Court stated that a leading principle pervading the entire law of criminal procedure is that, after indictment, nothing
shall be done in the absence of the accused.' While this rule may sometimes
nor his counsel could
be relaxed in a misdemeanor case, neither the defendant
32
waive the right to be personally present during trial.2

123. 880 U.S. 400 (1965).
124. People v. Rohwedder, 78 111. App. 2d 211, 21, 223 N.E2d 1, 4 (1967).
125.

Ingram v. Peyton, 867 F.2d 933 (4th Cir. 1966).

126. 110 US. 574 (1885).
127. Id. at 576.
128. Id. at 577.
129. Id. at 579.

130. 146 US. 870 (1892).
181. Id. at 872.
132. Id.
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In the trial appealed from in Shields v. United States,133 counsel for the
defendant and the district attorney made an agreement before the case was
submitted to the jury that the jury be kept in deliberation until they reached
a verdict on all of the several defendants. The jury returned to the courtroom
in the absence of the defendant and his counsel, and reported they could not
agree. The record does not disclose what instructions, if any, were given by
the judge; but it does indicate that the jury retired again and some time later
sent a written communication acquitting several defendants, adjudging some
guilty and reporting they could not agree on the appellant and two others.
The judge sent word that the jury would have to find whether appellant and
the others were guilty or not guilty. These communications were not made
in open court and neither appellant nor his counsel were present or advised
of them. The jury returned a verdict of guilty. In reversing the trial court, the
Supreme Court held the agreement could not be extended beyond its exact
terms and that it did not justify an exception to the rule entitling a defendant
to be present from the time the jury is empaneled until its discharge after
18 4
rendering the verdict.
Other cases have been cited for the proposition that the right of the
defendant to be present at trial can be waived by conduct of the defendant.
In Diaz v. United States 5 the defendant contended he was wrongly convicted because the trial proceeded in part during his absence. The accused was
represented by counsel at every stage of the proceedings. He was also present
in person at all the preliminary proceedings and during the major part of the
trial. On two occasions during the latter part of the trial, however, he voluntarily absented himself and sent the court a message expressly consenting that
the trial proceed in his absence. On these occasions two witnesses for the
Government were examined and cross-examined. No complaint grounded on
his absence was made in the trial court or in the lower appellate courts. The
defendant did not dispute that he had voluntarily waived his right to be
present, but contended he could not waive it and that the court did not have
the power to proceed in his absence. The Supreme Court stated that in cases
of felony, courts with substantial accord have regarded the right of confrontation as extending to every stage of a trial. The right to be present has encompassed empaneling of the jury and the reception of the verdict, and has
been deemed to be scarcely less important to the accused than the right of
trial itself. 36 An accused who is either in custody or charged with a capital
offense is regarded as incapable of waiving the right to be present - either
because his presence or absence is not within his control or because of the
3 7
seriousness of the offense and the penalty that could follow conviction.
However, the Court went on to state that where the offense is not capital and
the accused is not in custody, the prevailing rule is that if the defendant volun133. 273 U.S. 583 (1927).
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 588-89.
223 U.S. 442 (1912).
Id. at 455.
Id.
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tarily absents himself after the trial has begun in his presence, his absence
does not nullify what has been done nor prevent the completion of the trial.
His absence operates as a waiver of his right to be present and leaves the court
138
free to proceed with the trial as if he were present.
In reaching the decision in Diaz the Court recognized several early cases 3 9
that required the defendant's presence at all stages of the trial. However,
exceptions to this rule were also noted. 40 In Falk v. United States' 41 the
accused was at large on bail and, after being present when the trial was begun
and evidence given, he fled the jurisdiction. The trial proceeded in the accused's absence; the remaining evidence was taken, and a verdict of guilty
returned. The accused was subsequently apprehended and sentence was imposed, despite his objections that the trial had proceeded in his absence. The
court of appeals, in upholding the conviction, was concerned that the right
to bail would be endangered if a defendant could discontinue a trial by
42
absenting himself from the courtroom.
Later cases have also upheld the proposition that the right to be present
during trial is not absolute. In Snyder v. Massachusetts"- the court indicated
that the privilege of confrontation may be lost by consent or, at times, even
by misconduct.L' 4 Another case, Parker v. United States,145 involved a defendant injured in an automobile accident during his trial. Neither the court
nor counsel knew of the accident and assumed the defendant had misunderstood the hour when court convened or had been temporarily delayed. Defendant's counsel suggested that the trial proceed and five witnesses were
examined before it was learned the defendant's absence was caused by injury.
The appellate court held that since the defendant had immediately been
furnished a transcript of the five witnesses' testimony and did not object to
their testimony or request that they be examined further, he voluntarily
14 6
waived his right to be present.'
m 7
A further extension of Diaz was recently adopted in Illinois v. Allen.
At trial, Allen insisted upon conducting his own defense and was allowed
to do so, with court appointed counsel permitted to advise. After the prosecutor had accepted the first four jurors following their voir dire examinations, Allen began examining the first juror at great length. The court asked
138. Id.

139. Barton v. State, 67 Ga. 653 (1881).
140. Diaz v. United States, 223 U.. 442, 455-56 (1912).

141. 15 App. D.C. 446 (1899).
142. The court noted: "It does not seem to us to be consonant with the dictates of
commonsense that an accused person, being at large upon bail, should be at liberty whenever he pleased, to withdraw himself from the courts of his country and to break up a
trial already commenced. The practical result of such a proposition, if allowed to be law
would be to prevent any trial whatsoever until the accused person himself should be
pleased to permit it." Id. at 454.

143. 291 US. 97 (1934).
144. Id. at 106.
145.

184 F.2d 488 (4th Cir. 1950).

146. Id. at 489-90.
147. 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
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Allen to confine his questions to matters relating to the prospective juror's
qualifications. At that point, Allen began to argue with the judge. The court
then asked counsel to continue voir dire. Allen continued to talk, telling the
148
judge, "When I go out for lunchtime, you're going to be a corpse here."
He then tore a file belonging to his attorney and threw the papers on the
floor. The judge warned, "One more outbreak of that sort and I'll remove
you from the courtroom."'14 9 This had no effect upon Allen who stated,
"There's not going to be no trial either. I'm going to sit here and you're going
to talk and you can bring your shackles out and straightjacket and put them
on me and tape my mouth, but it will do no good because there's not going
to be no trial."' 150 Allen was then removed from the courtroom. After a noon
recess, he appeared before the court and requested to be allowed to be present. The court informed him he could remain if he behaved. However, he
soon again interrupted, saying, "There is going to be no proceeding. I'm going
to keep on talking all through the trial. There's not going to be no trial like
this. I want my sister and friends here in the court to testify for me."' 51 The
trial judge then ordered Allen from the courtroom. After the prosecution's
case had been presented in his absence, Allen was again given the option to
attend if he agreed to conduct himself properly. He gave some assurances
of proper conduct and was permitted to be present for the remainder of the
trial. Allen was convicted of armed robbery and the decision was upheld by the
152
Illinois supreme court.
The United States court of appeals reversed, relying upon Hopt v. Utah'5 '
for their holding that Allen should not have been excluded from the courtroom during the trial despite his disruptive and disrespectful conduct.' 54 The
court stated the proper course for the trial judge was to have restrained the
defendant by whatever means necessary, even if it required his being shackled
and gagged. 155 The court held the defendant's sixth amendment right to be
present was absolute and no matter how unruly or disruptive his conduct
might be, he could never be held to have lost that right as long as he continued
to insist upon it. 156 Misconduct as a waiver of the right to be present does not
correspond to the federal standard of waiver, which is an intentional relin5
quishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege. 7
In reinstating the conviction, the Supreme Court did not agree that the
sixth amendment, or the cases upon which the court of appeals relied, supported the reversal. The Court stated: "The broad dicta in Hopt v. Utah ...
that a trial case never continue in the defendant's absence . . ." has been
148. Id. at 340.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 341.
Illinois v. Allen, 37 Ill.
2d 167, 226 N.E.2d 1 (1967).

153. 110 U.S. 574 (1884).
154.
155.
156.
157.

Allen v. Illinois, 413 F.2d 232, 235 (8th Cir. 1969).
Id.
Id.
Id. See also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
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expressly rejected in Diaz.158 The Court held that a defendant can lose his
right to be present at trial if, after he is warned by the judge that he will
be removed if he continues his disruptive behavior, he nevertheless insists upon
conducting himself in a manner so disorderly, disruptive, and disrespectful
of the court that his trial cannot proceed in his presence. 159 The Court stated
that the contempt power and physical restraint are constitutionally permissible alternatives to removal of a defendant. 60 The Court concluded, however, that deplorable as it is to remove a man from his own trial, it is among
6
the tools available to cope with the unruly defendant.' '
The Supreme Court upheld the state court's removal of Allen primarily on
the basis of the previous decision in Diaz. However, in Diaz and the cases it
relied upon the defendant had voluntarily absented himself from the courtroom. The right of the defendant to be present was recognized, but if considered absolute and nonwaivable, the Court felt it would eventually force
limitations upon the right of a defendant to be free on bail. The Diaz court
indicated that this reasoning did not apply to a defendant who was not released on bail or one who was being tried for a capital offense.' 62 In removing
a defendant for misconduct, his rights are being balanced against the necessity
for dignity and decorum in the courtroom, a different consideration from that
of Diaz.
Furthermore, it is difficult to equate a voluntary absence from a trial, as in
jumping bail, with the circumstances leading to a defendant's involuntary
ouster by the court. It may be argued that in either situation, a defendant
by his own actions brings about his absence from the trial. More realistically,
however, it would seem that the two situations are readily distinguishable.
An analogy might be the difference between one who causes his death by his
own hand and one who shouts abuses at an assailant with a pistol pointed
at him - even an assailant who warns that continued misconduct will bring
an unfavorable response.
The criterion apparently utilized in Allen is similar to that controlling
in cases involving physical restraint. Removal is allowable where the
defendant's misconduct makes it impossible for the trial to continue in his
presence.' 63 Once again, the standard is one that does not lend itself to pre158. Illinois v. Allen, 397 US. 337, 342 (1970).
159. Id. at 343.
160. Id. at 344.
161. 397 U.S. 337, 347 (1970).
162. Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 355 (1911).
163. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970). As far as the meaning of the word "present"
is concerned, it has been stated by one court that "it is said it is not sufficient that the
defendant should be within the walls of the courthouse, but he should be present where
the trial is conducted, that he may see and be seen, hear and be heard." Derden v. State,
56 Tex. Crim. 396, 400, 120 S.W. 485, 487 (1909). See also Knight v. State, 273 Ala. 480, 142
So. 2d 899 (1962). However, at least one court has interpreted presence to be met when the
trial was broadcast to the defendant in another room. Commonwealth v. Lagnes, No. 4675
(Crim. Ct. Allegheny County, Pa. 1966). During trial, in that case, the judge was ridiculed and
insulted with terms such as "idiot," 'punk," "creep," and "dirty s.o.b." One defendant
warned the judge, "if I can't get my rights legally, I'll have to blow your head off. You
understand that, punk?" The court tolerated this prwccd.re for five weeks. But when the
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cise definition but requires case-by-case determination. However, in removing a defendant from his trial, the courts invade a right almost as inviolate
as the right to trial itself and thus removal should be used only in severe
situations.1 64
Selection of the Method
The determination of a proper method for dealing with aberrant behavior
may have an important effect upon the trial process. In imposing sanctions
for courtroom misconduct, the trial judge must be aware that an inappropriately severe sanction may be self-defeating. An improvident order will bring
"discredit to a court as certainly as the conduct it penalizes"165 and thus
provide a basis for further display of disrespect or defiance. According to
United States court of appeals Judge Harold R. Medina: "With these disruptive people, the more you kick them around or the more you clear the
court, the more unruly they become." 166 The least severe sanction capable of
coping with the disruption should be the one used.
In any case where there is reason to anticipate disruption, the judge
should make known in open court the type of behavior expected in the courtroom and the nature and extent of his powers.16 7 A prior warning that sanction
will be imposed is desirable before punishing all but the most outrageous
behavior and may be effective in preventing further disruptions.' 6 8 Moreover,
the practice of warning before imposing sanctions reduces the risk that attorneys will be deterred from exercising zealous advocacy by fear of punishment.
Illinois v. Allen did not establish any guidelines or priorities for the selection of a proper method. However, it is reasonable to assume that whenever
the disorder or disruption does not endanger the safety of the participants
and is nonviolent, contempt should be the first sanction used. In addition,
punishment of attorneys, parties, or witnesses during the trial may be prejudicial,16 and unless unusual circumstances require a prompt contempt proceeding it should be deferred. 170 Although it is usually desirable to defer adju-

judge was unable to make his charge to the jury heard above the comments of the
defendants, he had them gagged and straightjacketed. When even this failed to curtail
the commotion, the judge switched courtrooms, placed two of the defendants, with their
counsel, in another chamber and broadcast his charge to them by loudspeaker. Id. See also
TIME, Dec. 23, 1966, at 38.

164. Diaz v. United States, 223 US. 442, 455 (1911).
165. Sacher v. United States, 343 US. 1, 8 (1952).
166. TIME, March 9, 1970, at 31.

167. AMEwcAN

CoLLEGE oF TRIAL LAWYERS, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON DxIsUP-

PRocEss VIII, at 18 (1970).
168. Id. (commentary to VIII), at 18. Cf. ilinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 350 (1970)
(concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan suggesting that a warning is mandatory prior
to removal of a defendant).
169. See Sacher v. United States, 343 US. 1 (1952).

TION OF THE JUDICIAL

170. ABA

PROJECT ON

FUNCTION OF A
STANDARDS

TRiAL

STANDARD

JUDGE,

FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,

STANDARDS

PELATING TO THE

Commentary to F.3, at 15 [hereinafter cited as ABA,

RELATING TO A TRIAL JuDGE].
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dication of contempt until after the trial, it is not advisable to inform the

parties that a contempt proceeding is being held in abeyance." 1 A judge can
minimize subsequent disruption by making the party aware that his conduct is
considered contemptuous and that action will be taken after the trial. 72 Formal citations of contempt at this juncture would also reduce or eliminate questions concerning the validity of sentences for separate acts of misconduct.173
Before imposing any punishment for contempt, the judge should give the
party notice of the charges and at least a summary opportunity to adduce evidence or argument relevant to guilt or punishment.1 74 Although in-court contempts can be punished without notice of charges or an opportunity to be
heard,178 such a procedure has little to commend it and is likely to bring disrespect upon the court.17
Another method the court might utilize prior to proceeding to more
extreme action is a temporary recess. A short period of time can have the
effect of reducing emotional tension as well as allowing the participants a
chance to reconsider their actions. Postponement of trial until the participants
agree to behave is another alternative, yet one with obvious shortcomings.
If warning, contempt, and suspension of proceedings fail to provide the
necessary courtroom atmosphere, the court must consider more drastic action.
A more severe response must quickly be initiated when the disruption threatens violence. However, whenever the courtroom situation has degenerated to
this point, the alternatives become a choice of two evils -restraint or removal - both harmful to the judicial system. Which of the two methods is
the better alternative is debatable. The recommendations of the American
Bar Association Advisory Committee on the Judge's Functions state, however,
that removal is preferable to gagging or shackling the defendant17 7 If removed,
the defendant should be required to be present in the court building while
the trial is in process, be given the opportunity of learning of the trial proceedings through counsel at regular intervals, and must be given a continuing
opportunity to return to the courtroom upon a promise of good behavior.178
The defendant should be summoned to the courtroom at regular intervals and
the offer made each time in open court to permit him to stay.179 Although
the jury is not prejudiced by the sight of a restrained defendant when removal
is utilized, it can be argued that a jury should not be free to decide the fate
of an accused without observing him throughout the trial. However, the sight
of a man physically restrained and gagged, even by the sophisticated restraint
of a transparent booth, is bound to be prejudicial.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
at 16.
177.
178.
179.
session,

Id.
Id. at 15-16.
Id. at 16; see Yates v. United States, 355 U.S. 66 (1957).
ABA, STANDARDS RE.ATING TO A TRuAL JUDGE, supra note 170, F.3, at 15.
Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289 (1888).
ABA, STANDARDS RELATING TO A TRIAL JUDGE, supra note 170, Commentary to F.4,
Id. C. 1,at 6.
Id.
Id. E.g., the defendant should be summoned at a commencement of each daily
half-day session, or after recess as may be appropriate.
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A further factor that should be considered is the effect of physical restraint
upon the other participants and spectators. The emotional impact of physical
restraint can easily arouse the emotions of those present and, in some cases,
those affected through the news media. Little can create more disrespect and
lack of confidence in the judicial system than the spectacle of a man bound
and gagged at trial. In the event physical restraint does become necessary, some
safeguards are desirable. As a minimum consideration the defendant should
be allowed an opportunity to have the restraint removed at regular intervals
and reasonable care should be taken to assure that the defendant is not injured
or unduly restricted.
Tim

PouarmcAL TRIuL

The dissent by Justice Douglas in Illinois v. Allen raises particularly
perplexing questions regarding treatment of the unruly defendant. Justice
Douglas states that his "difficulty is not with the basic hypothesis of [the]
decision, but with the use of [the] case to establish appropriate guidelines
for judicial control."8s The questions raised are whether the guidelines
established apply in a case with political overtones and whether, in such a
setting, the accused has rights of confrontation that the law invades at its
peril.
It is impossible to exactly define a political trial. There are degrees of
political implications in any trial. Some would observe social (that is, political) injustice in the most mundane crimes when, for example, the defendant
is disadvantaged. But no one will deny that in the course of history there
have been trials so intimately involved in politics that they could fairly be
called political trials. One such instance was the trial of William Penn in
1670. Penn was cited for causing a riot because he preached a sermon after
his church had been closed by the Conventicle Act. Although acquitted by the
jury, Penn was jailed for his contemptuous conduct during the trial. Enlightened by the passage of time, his remarks reveal a man, not contemptuous,
but crying out for what be believed to be his basic rights as an individual.l 81
180. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 387, 351 (1970) (opinion of Douglas, J.).
181. See id. at 353-55 quoting from The Trial of William Penn, 6 How. St. Tr. 951,
958-59 (1670):
"Penn: I affirm that I have broken no law ... I desire you let me know by what law
it is you prosecute me, and upon what law you ground my indictment.
Recorder: Upon the common law.
Penn: Where is that common law?
Recorder: You must not think that I am able to run up so many years, and over so
many adjudged cases, which we call common law, to answer your curiosity.

Penn: I say again, unless you show me, and the people, the law you ground your indictment upon, I shall take it for granted your proceedings are merely arbitrary.

Recorder: Sir, you are a troublesome fellow, and it is not for the honour of the court
to suffer you to go on.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1971

25

Florida LawIN
Review,
23, Iss. 3 [1971], Art. 7
DISRUPTION
THE Vol.
COURTROOM

An example of a political trial from American history is the trial of August SpieslB2 during the bloody days of the labor movement in the 1880's.183
The whole case was built around a conspiracy theory in which Spies and the
other defendants, alleged anarchists, were charged as accessories in a Chicago
bombing incident. The state introduced evidence of a scheme to blow up
police stations, but little attempt was made to relate the defendants to the
scheme or the scheme to the actual bomb throwing. The jury, mostly supervisory personnel from large factories and not one laborer, returned recommen84
dations of death for all but one of the defendants.'
A further example of a political trial is the Sacco-Vanzetti case, 8 5 arising
out of the Red scare of the 1920's. The case began as a prosecution for a
commonplace, although brutal, murder and developed gradually into one
of the world's most publicized trials.8 6 Before it was ended, it was more than
a trial; it became one of those events that divides a society.' 8 ' It would seem
that a prosecutor and a court trying two Italian radicals before a jury of
native New Englanders in 1921 would have a duty to keep justice free from
infection of passion or prejudice. 88 In the case of Sacco and Vanzetti, no such
Penn: I have asked but one question and you have not answered me: though the rights

and privileges of every Englishman be concerned in it.
Recorder: Sir, we must stand to hear you talk all night.
Penn: I design no affront to the court, but to be heard in my
plainly tell you, that if you deny me Oyer of that law, which you
you do at once deny me an acknowledged right, and evidence to
resolution to sacrifice the privileges of Englishmen to your sinister

just plea: and I must
suggest I have broken,
the whole world your
and arbitrary designs."

Recorder: Take him away. My Lord, if you take not some course with this pestilent
fellow, to stop his mouth, we shall not be able to do anything tonight.
Mayor: Take him awiy, turn him away, turn him into the baledock.
182. Spies v. People, 122 Ill.
1 (1887).
183. The Spies case grew out of the Haymarket riot in Chicago in 1886 in which police

clashed with striking workers and their supporters. As a result of the confrontation, seven
policemen and four civilians lost their lives; scores of others were wounded. For a detailed
historical account of the events leading to the incident, see W. SWINnER, COURT AND CONsTrru20Tn CENTUGRY (1969).
184. Id. at 39-45.
185. Commonwealth v. Nicola Sacco, 255 Mass. 869, 151 N.E. 839 (1926).
186. "Rightly or wrongly, the case of Sacco and Vanzetti did more to destroy abroad
our ancient reputation of being a 'land of the free' than all of the other historical
incidents of the last century.. . it is scarcely impossible to exaggerate the unfortunate effect
of the case upon foreign opinion of American Justice." G. JOUGHLN &E. MORGAN, THs LEGACY
oF SAcco AND VANz-rrI 31 (1948)
187. Twenty years after the electrocution in 1947, a group of distinguished citizens
including Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Albert Einstein, Herbert H. Lehman, Dean Wesley
A. Sturges of Yale Law School, and Provost Paul H. Buck of Harvard University offered to the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts a bas-relief plaque of the two Italians for erection on
Boston Commons. However, the Governor to whom the decision fell, considered public
opinion in that state still to be too divided to justify acceptance. A Schlesinger, Introduction
to G. JOUGHLN & E. MORGAN, THE LEGACY OF SACCO AND VANzEr at xvi (1948).
188. F. FRANKFURTER, THE CASE OF SACCO AND VANZET'I 59 (1927). See also August v.

TION IN THE

United States, 257 F. 388, 393 (8th Cir. 1918).
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restraints were respected. By systematic exploitation of the defendants' alien
blood, their imperfect knowledge of English, their unpopular social views,
and their opposition to the War, the district attorney invoked against them
a riot of political passion and patriotic sentiment;18 9 and the trial judge cooperated in the process.190
Vanzetti did not feel he had undergone trial for robbery and murder. His
words to the court before being sentenced to death reflect a man who feels
that society's courts could offer him no justice:191
This is what I say: I would not wish to a dog or to a snake, to the
most low or misfortunate creature of the earth-I would not wish to
any of them what I have had to suffer for things I am not guilty of.
189. F. FRANKEURTER, supra note 188, at 47-48. The opening question on cross-examination

of Vanzetti demonstrates the method utilized by the district attorney in prosecuting an
avowed anarchist for a crime as unconnected with political passion as a payroll robbery.
"Q. (By Mr. Katzmann): So you left Plymouth, Mr. Vanzetti, in May 1917, to dodge the
draft, did you?
A. Yes sir.
Q. When this country was at war, you ran away, so you would not have to fight as a
soldier?
A. Yes (R.842-3).
Q. You were going to advise in a public meeting men who had gone to war? Are you
that man?
A. Yes sir, I am that man, not the man you want me, but I am that man. (R. 865.6)."
When Sacco took the stand, once again the method was demonstrated.
"Q. (By Mr. Katzman): Did you say yesterday you love a free country?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you love this country in the month of May, 1917?
A. I did not say. ..I don't want to say I did not love this country.
Q. Did you love this country in that month of 1917?
A. If you can, Mr. Katzmann, if you give me that ...I could explain....
Q. Do you understand that question?
A.

Yes.

Q. Then you will please answer it?
A. I can't answer it in one word.
Q. You can't say whether you loved the United States of America one week before the
day you enlisted for the first draft?
A. I can't say in one word, Mr. Katzmann (R. 919).
Q. Did you love this country in the last week of May, 1917?
A. That is pretty hard for me to say in one word, Mr. Katzmann.
Q. There are two words you can use, Mr. Sacco, 'yes' or 'no.' Which one is it?
A.

Yes.

Q. And in order to show your love for this United States of America when she was
about to call upon you to become a soldier you ran away to Mexico (R. 919).
Q. Did you go to Mexico to avoid being a soldier for this country that you loved?
A. Yes. (R. 920)."
190. In November 1924 after Judge Thayer, the trial judge, had denied the second to
sixth motions for a new trial, and before the seventh motion was presented, he said to
Professor James P. Richardson of Dartmouth College: "Did you see what I did with those
anarchistic bastards the other day? I guess that will hold them for a while.... Let them
go to the Supreme Court now and see what they can get out of them." H. ERHMANN, THE
CASE THAT WImL NoT DIE 472 (1969).
191. Record, V:4904, Commonwealth v. Nicola Sacco, 255 Mass. 369, 151 N.E. 839 (1926).
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But my conviction is that I have suffered for things I am guilty of. I
am suffering because I am a radical and indeed I am a radical; I have
suffered because I am an Italian and indeed I am an Italian; I have
suffered more for my family and foi my beloved than for myself; but
I am so convinced to be right that if you could execute me two times,
and if I could be reborn two other times, I would like again to do what
I have done already. Thank you.
Recent history has not neglected the political trial. The Chicago Seven
Conspiracy Trial' 92 offers a recent test of the guidelines established in Illinois
v. Allen. The events culminating in the trial occurred in Chicago during the
1968 Democratic National Convention. Although a study committee of the
National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence largely laid
blame for rioting to factors other than political activism,93 eight protestors
were prosecuted by the Justice Department for conspiring to riot. The trial
had more impact than any American criminal proceeding since the Sacco and
Vanzetti case. Emotion flooded the country as many, including the defendants,
felt that the right to dissent itself was on trial.19 ' The trial judge's efforts to
retain the respect and dignity of the courtroom led not only to unprecedented use of the contempt power, but more seriously, to the binding and gagging
of a defendant. The events leading to the binding and gagging of defendant
Bobby Seale again reveals a man, as William Penn before him, asking for what
he believes to be his basic right as an individual:
October 29, 1969.
Seale: Before the redirect, I would like to request again - demand that I be able to cross-examine the witness. My lawyer is not here. I
think I have a right to defend myself in this courtroom.
Court: Take the jury out, and they may go to lunch with the usual
order.
Seale: You have George Washington and Benjamin Franklin sitting
in a picture behind you, and they were slave owners. That's what they
were. They owned slaves. You are acting in the same manner, denying
me my constitutional rights....

Court: Well, I have been called a racist, a Fascist -he has pointed
to a picture of George Washington behind me and called him a slaveowner and....
192. United States v. Dellinger, Crim. No. 69CR180 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
193. Report Submitted by Daniel Walker, Director of the Chicago Study Team to the
National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence (1968). "The vast majority
of the demonstrators were intent on expressing by peaceful means their dissent either from
society generally or from the Administration's policies in Vietnam.... On the part of the
police, there was enough wild club swinging, enough cries of hatred, enough gratuitous
beating to make the conclusion inescapable that individual policemen, and lots of them,
committed violent acts far in excess of the requisite force for crowd dispersal or arrest. To
read dispassionately the hundreds of statements describing first hand the event . . . is to
become convinced of the presence of what can only be called a 'police riot."' Id.
194. "Our crime was that we were beginning to live a new and contagious life style
without official authorization. We were tried for being out of control." RAMe
Ts, July 1970,
at 20 (reprintof T. HAYDEN, THE TUAsL (1970).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol23/iss3/7

28

588

1

Middlebrooks:
Disruption
in the Courtroom [Vol. XXIHI
LAW REVIEW
OF FLORIDA
UNIVERSITY

Seale: They were slave owners. Look at history.
Court: As though I had anything to do with that.
Seale: They were slave owners. You got them up there.
Court: He has been known as the Father of this Country and I
would that is a pretty good picture to have in the United States District
Court.
Kunstter: We all share a common guilt, your Honor.
Court: I didn't think I would ever live to sit on a bench or be in a
courtroom where George Washington was assailed by a defendant in a
criminal case and a judge was criticized for having his portrait on the
wall.

Seale: I want to know will you - Oh, look - it's a form of racism,

racism is what stopped my argument.
Court: Mr. Seale, do you want to stop or do you want me to direct
the Marshall....
Seale: I want to argue the point about this so you can get an understanding of the fact that I have a right to defend myself.
Court: We will take a recess. Take that defendant into that room in
there and deal with him as he should be dealt with in this circumstance.

Kunstler: I wanted to say the record should indicate that Mr. Seale
is seated on a metal chair, each hand is handcuffed to the leg of the
chair on both the right and left sides so he cannot raise his hands,
and a gag is tightly pressed into his mouth and tied to the rear, and
that when he attempts to speak, a muffled sound comes out as he has
done several times since he has been bound and gagged.
The deep conflicts inherent in a political trial stem from the fact that the
ideas and lifestyle of the litigants and the court are inextricably intertwined
in the process of adjudicating guilt or innocence. An answer, of course, would
be to eliminate political trials. Only rarely will a true political trial offer the
litigants hope of real justice. This conclusion has led to the characterization of
the political trial as one of the tools society has used to suppress its dissidents. 1 95 Regardless of its characterization, the political trial may focus attention on the relative strengths or weaknesses of a cause, but it leaves unsettled
the underlying social friction. While the judicial machinery may provide a
preferable mode of change to other forms of civil disobedience, political
justice must be finally achieved in forums other than the courts.
History's warnings point out that courts have not in every instance served
the ends of justice. The judges and juries involved in each instance were
sincere men believing the justice they invoked was meaningful and inclusive.
Only time can judge the merits of society's case or that of the defendant. In
the end, it might be the judge who will have to confess that he has served an
unworthy system; or the defendant who will have to concede how short of
his expectations his cause had fallen. In a trial with strong political connotations, where chance of injustice is admittedly increased, courts should use
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restraint in dealing with the unruly defendant. In an area where basic premises
and lifestyles are so closely intertwined in the process of adjudicating guilt
or innocence, it is paramount that the court proceed with reservation when
weighing the court's interest in order and decorum against the defendant's
right to be heard.
CONCLUSION

The presence of order in the courtroom is essential to the proper functioning of the judicial system. However, "order and decorum" must not
become an end in itself, but ideally should proceed from a genuine respect for
the courts that will engender the necessary climate for effective justice. As
noted by former Attorney General, Ramsey Clark: 96
Respect does not come easily these days. It is not always accorded even
when earned. But we must never value decorum over justice. If the
rule of law is to prevail it must proceed wisely, deliberately, fairly, and
rationally. It must never react with emotion.
In the final analysis, the damage to society that results from physical
restraint, removal from trial, or abuse of the contempt power, particularly in
trials with political implications, may be greater than the isolated disruptions
they are intended to prevent.
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